Tagged: Court of Appeal of Singapore

The Status of International Human Rights Conventions under Singapore Domestic Law

Jaclyn L Neo
Assistant Professor,
Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore

The High Court today struck out Wee Kim San Lawrence Bernard’s application for judicial review on the basis that the plaintiff had no locus standi. Mr. Wee had argued that the government’s failure to clarify the position that homosexual males are protected from discrimination under Article 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore is a violation of his constitutional rights. One of Mr. Wee’s arguments was that the Singapore government’s obligation to provide protections for homosexuals stems from its accession to both the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“UNCRPD”) and the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”).

Leaving aside the substantive question of whether the provisions under UNCRPD or CEDAW cover and assist claims for protection against sexual orientation discrimination, the case raises interesting legal question of the status of ratified treaties/conventions under Singapore law. Singapore is a dualist state. This means that ratified treaties/conventions are not part of domestic law until specifically incorporated. This contrasts with monist states, where treaties are self-executing/automatically incorporated; no additional legislative act is required. Continue reading

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Hougang By-election Case: What Court Decision on By-election Reveals

A poll card issued for the 2011 general election

A poll card issued for the 2011 general election. (Photograph by Jacklee [public domain or CC-BY-SA-3.0], via the Wikimedia Commons.)

Dr Jack Tsen-Ta Lee
Assistant Professor of Law
School of Law, SMU

THE COURT OF APPEAL’S judgment of 5 July in Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General[1] – popularly known as the Hougang by-election case – shows that the Court sees its role as policing the margins rather than involving itself in the heart of politics.

The decision came as a surprise to those used to a judicial stance that is fairly deferential towards the Government. It is one of only a handful of cases in which the courts have not accepted the Government’s interpretation of the Constitution.

Continue reading

The Past, Present and Future of the Internal Security Act

Handcuffs

Illustration by Vectorportal.com [CC-BY-2.0],
via Flickr.)

Jack Tsen-Ta Lee
Assistant Professor of Law
School of Law, SMU

MORE THAN 60 YEARS have passed since a law permitting detention without trial first took effect in Singapore. The need for the current version of this law, the Internal Security Act (ISA), has been questioned on many occasions, most recently last year when Malaysia announced that it was reviewing its own version of the Act. Each time, the Government has reaffirmed the statute’s relevance. Is this statute still necessary in modern-day Singapore? Continue reading

Hougang By-election Case: The State of Play

A view of the Supreme Court Building with Parliament House in the foreground

A view of the Supreme Court Building (with disc) with Parliament House in the foreground. (By Smuconlaw (CC-BY-SA-3.0), via the Wikimedia Commons) On 9 April 2012 the High Court, which sits in the building, issued the grounds of its decision in the Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General, the Hougang by-election case.

Jack Tsen-Ta Lee
Assistant Professor of Law
School of Law, SMU

 

ON 9 APRIL, Justice Philip Pillai, sitting in the High Court, released the grounds for his decision for granting leave – that is, permission – for Mdm Vellama Marie Muthu’s judicial review application in the Hougang by-election case. She had applied for a declaration that the Prime Minister does not have unfettered discretion when deciding whether or not a by-election should be called in Hougang Single Member Constituency, and a mandatory order requiring the PM to advise the President to call a by-election within three months or some other reasonable time determined by the court.

A mandatory order is a type of prerogative order. Prerogative orders, formerly called prerogative writs, were so called because at first they could only be issued at the prerogative of the British Crown. However, by the end of the 16th century, any aggrieved citizen could ask for them to be issued.

An application for one or more prerogative orders is made pursuant to Order 53 of the Rules of Court, and is a two-stage process. The hearing before Justice Pillai was the first stage. Here, what the applicant had to do was to seek leave to apply for a mandatory order. Why is this stage necessary? As the judge pointed out, it is “intended to be a means of filtering out groundless or hopeless cases at an early stage, and its aim is to prevent a wasteful use of judicial time and to protect public bodies from harassment (whether intentional or otherwise) that might arise from a need to delay implementing decisions, where the legality of such decisions is being challenged”.[1] Continue reading